In the years that preceded the Great Recession of 2008-09, many financial institutions in the developed world engaged in practices that increased the risk of systemic failure in the markets. The economics profession itself, overly confident of its ability to engineer stability, encouraged financial actors to exceed the traditional dictates of caution. The financial crisis that ensued also revealed many fault lines. One of the most glaring was an absence of international coordination, which encouraged regulatory shopping. Dramatic actions taken by public authorities in the fall of 2008 avoided collapse, but left a legacy of increased moral hazard, to which the best long-term answer is radical structural reform. Asian emerging markets were, by and large, spared the worst of the storm. They should learn from the mistakes of their peers in the developed world, but not reject wholesale the benefits of free markets.
cated corrective measures that political leaders did not follow. I think this view brushes over increasing and inherent weaknesses in developed ªnancial markets, which caused them to become excessively vulnerable to collapse. When a shock came, the resulting disruption was vastly magniªed by these inherent structural weaknesses.
Large macroeconomic structural imbalances did clearly impact domestic economic conditions in the United States. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) explain, some observers claim that the underlying cause was insufªcient saving in the United States, others claim that it was excessive saving in Asia. (Obstfeld and Rogoff themselves argue that both factors were at work.) In either case, the current account deªcit of the United States facilitated the maintenance of low interest rates in that country. If the United States had not run such a large current account deªcit, and if Asian central banks had not purchased such large amounts of U.S. treasury obligations, the U.S. authorities might have felt more pressure to correct ªscal imbalances, and interest rates might also have been higher.
In turn, a prolonged period of low interest rates in the United States encouraged many ªnancial professionals to take increasing risk. With interest rates so low, and debt so cheap, it was tempting to go for a home run. Raghuram (2006) discusses the incentives for investment managers to increase their exposure to risk in a low interest rate environment. Indeed, low interest rates and a conscious push by policymakers to favor home ownership were important contributions to the housing boom, which became a bubble, and eventually burst.
But are these macroeconomic developments sufªcient to explain what happened? Developed countries have experienced bubbles before: the tech bubble and housing bubbles in other countries, for example. Why, in this case, when the bubble burst, did the ªnancial system in the United States and Europe collapse so dramatically? The magnitude and success (for now) of the rescue operations tend to make one forget the depth of the abyss into which global ªnancial markets appeared to be plunging.
When one considers the rapidity with which strains in the mortgage markets spread through the rest of the system, one can only conclude that the ªnancial system itself had fault lines that made it vulnerable to any important failure in any sector of the markets. As mortgage markets dried up, so did markets for automobile loans, credit card loans, student loans, and so forth. The inter-bank market froze; there was almost a run on money markets, and bank credit to the economy came to a standstill.
Why were ªnancial markets in the United States and Europe so vulnerable? What made them so inter-connected and so susceptible individually and jointly to seizing up? The consensus answer seems to be (1) the complexity of and indeed the ºaws in the structured products in which so many institutions in Europe and the United States invested so heavily, and (2) the startling extent of the use of leverage by these same institutions.
In any ªnancial system in which institutions borrow short and lend long, the risk of a panic is always present. If creditors lose conªdence in the ability of banks or money funds or hedge funds, they may rush to exit, and precipitate a liquidity crisis in the institutions where they put their money. This risk is ampliªed if the assets that the short-term borrowings have ªnanced are opaque, and if their valuation is extremely volatile.
The story of 2008-09 has now been told many times. The problem was not just that mortgage loans failed, but that nobody knew how uncredit-worthy the residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and the collateralized debt obligations held by their counterparties were. Financial institutions stopped lending to each other overnight because they had no way of estimating how far the problem extended. Leverage ratios of 40 and 50 to 1 exacerbated the tensions. In a crisis, an institution with a high degree of leverage and large short-term liabilities needs to have assets that it can monetize quickly, and at predictable values. The simultaneous ubiquity of opaque structured products and of excessive leverage proved to be a deadly mixture.
In retrospect, the important question is: Why did ªnancial practices veer so recklessly into this danger zone? Where were the prudent bankers? Where was every participant's instinct for self-preservation? Why didn't the owners of the capital that was being put at risk wave red ºags?
Much has been written about incentives and governance.
1 It is now widely appreciated that variable compensation schemes that depend on annual targets and feature no recapture asymmetrically favor risk taking. The message, "Heads I win, tails you lose," is loaded. In the United States, the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) has wisely proposed to bring compensation schemes into the purview of its surveillance. Changes are also afoot in the United States and elsewhere to increase the voice of shareholders. This is an important development for non-ªnancial as well as ªnancial corporations.
But incentives are not everything. When Bear Stearns was sold for US$ 10, its chief executive ofªcer (CEO) owned 6 percent of the ªrm. When Lehman Brothers ªled for bankruptcy, Richard Fuld and other top executives had an overwhelming share of their wealth invested in the ªrm. In both cases, management's interests were aligned with those of their shareholders. And, nonetheless, management accelerated as it headed for the wall.
Fuld and many others ªrmly believed that what was happening could not happen, that their strategies were the right ones, and that the storm would pass. They were convinced that the structured products that they had promoted and invested heavily in were the wave of the future, and that their risk management procedures protected them from default. Sorkin (2009) reports the unswerving belief of the top management of Lehman Brothers until the bitter end in the validity of its business model. One of the surprising aspects of the ªnancial crisis of 2008-09 was the degree to which the principal actors, and in fact large segments of the informed public, were convinced of the intelligence, validity, and soundness of the very practices that nearly brought the system to ruin.
Economists bear a large part of the responsibility for that illusion. Acemoglu (2009) The problem was not so much that the economists were wrong, but rather that they abandoned reasonable skepticism about their conclusions. Much has been made of the fact that the econometric models that investment banks, insurance companies, and rating agencies use to value complex Collateralized Debt Obligations were inadequate. Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) document the way in which insufªcient attention to fat tails and conªdence intervals, and faulted derivation of the correlations between different tranches of these pools, led to misleading results. The blind faith that the executives in charge put in the conclusions of these models was particularly harmful.
Much has also been made of the degree to which the perfect market paradigm was over-sold. As a hypothesis on how markets function, many of its tenets provide useful tools for analysis. The Capital Asset Pricing Model and its progeny have transformed the thinking of ªnancial professionals, and increased the acumen and the logic of their analyses. In that sense, the assumption of perfect markets was not wrong; it was useful for certain purposes, but not for all purposes. As every student of science knows, any model is a simpliªcation, a powerful tool for thinking through aspects of a problem, but a tool to be used with circumspection.
Some economists indeed made a leap of faith, and argued that the perfect market hypothesis was the most powerful tool the profession had for analyzing all important problems. Jensen (1978, p. 95) claimed, "there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efªcient Markets Hypothesis." That view was not held unanimously. But the believers did convince a large fraction of opinion makers and political leaders of the power of their argument. In those Panglossian times, it was only too easy to accept the assurances of our profession that there were no economic problems that could not be solved, and that depressions and inºations were a thing of the past. Rational leaders who understood economics could be counted on to ensure growth and stability.
The problem with this rosy view is that it allows and encourages people to put down their guard. If macroeconomic stability could be taken for granted, if the world was indeed becoming increasingly less risky, then previous precaution could be neglected. If all bets could be expected to succeed, there was no downside to taking on more leverage. And the complex instruments designed by the technicians of modern ªnance could be initiated, sold, and purchased without hesitation. Thus economists themselves contributed to the excesses that eventually caused the system nearly to crash? There were a few naysayers-Cassandras like Nouriel Roubini, 3 and also a few hedge fund managers who saw the dangers and made bets on the collapse that eventually occurred. The global economy and the reputation of the economics profession would be stronger today if there had been more such actors.
Roughly a year and a half after the crash and the Great Bailout, where do we stand? Economic conditions and policy issues are radically different in the developed and developing worlds. The balance of this essay will address ªrst the situation in the United States and Europe, and then, in conclusion, the situation in emerging Asia.
The United States and Europe
In the United States and Europe, the legacy of the Great Recession of 2008-09 is one of asset destruction, fear, massive public deªcits, and unprecedented levels of public debt. The crisis may not be over. The destruction of private asset values remains so massive that it is difªcult to see where the demand-without which there cannot be a durable recovery-will come from. Public authorities, which through their interventions forestalled a worse crisis, are now themselves struggling with excessive debt. The tension surrounding the debt of Greece is a potential harbinger of worse things to come. Budgetary consolidation is an urgent priority around the world. If political resistance causes delay, a public debt crisis may become inevitable. Consolidation may not begin in earnest until there has been another panic, this one focused on the state of public ªnances.
Given this depressed outlook, there is no chance that any major ªnancial institution in the developed world will soon repeat the excesses of the beginning of this century. Neither Bank of America, nor Royal Bank of Scotland, nor Deutsche Bank, nor Citibank is likely to take uncalculated risks anytime in the next decade.
So do we need regulatory reform? The question is rhetorical because political pressures are such that reform is going to happen whether we need it or not. There is irresistible political mileage to be made in every country in the developed world from bashing ªnancial institutions. The question should perhaps rather be: Since we are going to have regulatory reform, what should its focus be?
Regulatory reform is certainly needed at a minimum to ensure that existing rules are not thwarted. Our present structure of competing jurisdictions, both nationally and Eliminating loopholes within any one country is feasible, if the political will to do so exists. Getting national authorities to agree to coordinate their regulations internationally is another matter. If it is one of the most important priorities for regulatory reform, it is sadly also the most difªcult to achieve. One has to hope that the political momentum that seems to exist now will not be wasted.
Other speciªc institutions and markets call for enhanced and improved regulation. It is important that bank capital requirements be made counter-cyclical rather than pro-cyclical. The conºicts of interest inherent in the way rating agencies operate should be eliminated. There is a need for institutions and regulations to ensure transparency and a level playing ªeld in the trading of some new ªnancial products (i.e., credit default swaps [CDSs] and other derivatives).
Beyond international coordination, the most challenging aspect of the regulatory agenda is how to deal with what has come to be known as the "too big to fail" problem.
In the last two decades, global ªnancial markets have experienced a sequence of major crises-the Mexican Peso crisis (1994), the Asian ªnancial crisis (1997 -98), Long Term Capital Management (1998 , and the current crisis-in which public authorities stepped in each time to guarantee certain institutions, provide conditional ªnance to others, and, nationalize still others, one way or another, to avoid the complete implosion of markets. Over time, the sums that had to be deployed grew. Pri-vate decision makers can not be faulted if what they learned from this is that there are no risks that public authorities will not cover to avoid collapse.
Economists rightly focus on the moral hazard generated by these implicit guarantees. This problem haunted decision makers during the fall of 2008. If the Fed partially guaranteed the toxic assets of Bear Stearns and saved its counterparties, what would other players think? In the case of Lehman Brothers, the authorities felt they had no alternative but to let it fail, and they may have also hoped that the example would discipline institutions that had gone too far. Paradoxically, the fall-out from the failure of this institution-which was neither gigantic, nor a bank-was so catastrophic that authorities in the United States and Europe had to rush to implement the biggest package of bailouts in history. No one should have any illusion: The survivors read between the lines that they would all be saved. I happen to have been attending an off-the-record presentation of a new fund by the CEO of a major, highly leveraged, and troubled private equity ªrm in New York shortly after the U.S. Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). One of his ªrst remarks was, "Well, now we know that we will all still be here at the end of the day." One could not invent a clearer expression of moral hazard.
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The essence of the problem is size and concentration. If there were hundreds of different institutions, each following a different strategy and each with a different view of the world, authorities would have no reason to hesitate to allow one or a few of them to fail because they had made bad bets. However, if a few giant institutions dominate the markets-or if one or more of them, not necessarily giants, have a strategically important position at a vital node in the relationships among many other participants-then letting one of these fail is tantamount to letting the ªnancial system as a whole crash.
Unfortunately, changing the size and the composition of the players in global ªnancial markets is a tall order. It is almost impossible to do by any single sweep of legislation. If it is to happen, it will have to happen progressively, over time.
The Volker rule is not the answer. The idea of the rule is that commercial banks would be prohibited from engaging in high risk activities-like proprietary trading of derivatives and in-house promotion of private equity or hedge funds. 7 These activities would be pushed into "casino" banks, whose liquidity would not be guaranteed by any public authorities. The trouble with the rule is that it pushes much of modern ªnance into the casino banks, beyond the reach of the authorities. In 2008-09, the most spectacular failures and bailouts involved non-banks (e.g., Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brithers, AIG). Unfettered, casino ªnance would thrive, and the more it grew, the more systemic risks would proliferate.
For a public body to sanction any institution that threatens systemic stability, without thereby precipitating a general collapse of markets, it must have authority over all institutions of systemic importance. It is illusory to think that a regulatory authority could allow a systemically important institution to collapse simply because that institution had excluded itself from the authority's control.
Paradoxically, in Europe-where almost all banks are universal banks, and are likely to remain so-the authorities could be in a better position to control systemic risk than in the United States, where universal banking is less ªrmly established and might indeed recede if the Volker rule is implemented. Where universal banking prevails, the banking institutions that take on more risk are just as subject to regulatory control as the plain vanilla banks.
The power that is most important for a regulator monitoring systemic risk is the authority to seize and break up a problem institution. This would mean, in the case of a giant bank that had failed, to separate the pieces and require each to stand alone. The natural tendency, in the midst of a crisis, when a regulatory authority is bailing out an institution, is toward consolidation. Often, the regulator, under pressure to stop contagion, divides up the pieces of the failed institution and distributes them to its surviving competitors. The result is more, not less, concentration. To resist this tendency, authorities will need a lot of imagination, will have to be prepared well in advance, and will have to display considerable political courage. Some form of prearranged liquidation procedures may be the answer, but they clearly should not be drawn up by the interested parties alone.
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Advance planning is necessary. However, we should not delude ourselves. It is unlikely to be sufªcient to forestall the next crisis, when it eventually comes. If the threat of being wiped out did not deter the manager-owners of the institutions that plunged to their demise in 2008-09, the threat of being broken up is not likely to stop them next time. What is important is that regulators be given the authority now to break up the failed giants next time. That way, and perhaps only that way, will global ªnancial markets evolve toward more stable structures.
Additionally, we should not be under the illusion that more competitive, less concentrated global ªnancial structures will be immune to bouts of collective excess. It is important to remember that, as the crisis of 2008-09 developed, almost all the major actors-including the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer-believed in the myth that brought the house down.
Emerging Asia and concluding remarks
In closing, I would like to comment on ªnancial markets and their liberalization in emerging Asia. Emerging Asia, like Europe, is far from homogeneous, and indeed I shall argue that recommendations that may be appropriate for one country may be completely off the mark in another.
Financial institutions in emerging Asia were, by and large, spared direct involvement in the activities that proved so destabilizing in developed markets. They did not originate and did not purchase signiªcant amounts of structured products. In addition, their short-term foreign currency indebtedness was moderate, and the authorities in these countries held large foreign currency reserves as a buffer against exogenous shocks.
In the literature on ªnancial liberalization and in the international public debate, one can observe a certain degree of backlash against the faith in markets that characterized the previous 20 years. This is in part a natural reaction to the overselling of the perfect market paradigm. It is also a response to the crisis itself. Though I have argued that regulatory failure was far from the whole problem, it was clearly part of the problem. New literature is emerging, which purports to connect the origin of the crisis and also its incidence, with openness, private ownership, and international competition in ªnancial markets. It is still unclear how this literature relates to earlier arguments of Caprio and Honohan (2002) and others that ªnancial openness can cause instability in the short term, and yet promote economic development in the long term.
The knowledge that they have averted the worst of the storm, and that opinion leaders in the developed world are questioning the merits of unbridled liberalization may lead decision makers in Asia to conclude that the push for ªnancial liberalization in recent years was misguided and should be halted or reversed.
My ªrst comment on this view is that the best way to avoid a banking crisis is indeed not to have a banking system. If volatility of any kind is to be avoided at all cost, that may be a model to pursue. One should not be surprised if it tends to repress private consumption and encourage corruption. The most problematic aspect of the model may be that, in today's globalized world it is destined to break down.
My second comment is that the beneªts of liberalization depend quite a bit on where you stand. If your initial conditions are those of completely open, liberalized, and deregulated ªnancial markets, then, indeed, it may be wise for your authorities to pause and concentrate on effective implementation of the regulations that they have. However, if your initial conditions are those of a completely closed and stateowned ªnancial system, then some degree of prudent liberalization may be an important priority.
What one hopes is that the leaders who make ªnancial policy in emerging Asia will learn from the mistakes of their peers in developed countries, without rejecting wholesale the potential beneªts of free markets.
